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THE IMPACT OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE ON POLITICAL DECISION MAKING*
Michael J. White
Northwestern University
In the past 75 years in the United States and other industrialized
countries a large number of managerial and scientific technologies have
penetrated organizations, public and private, and been integrated into
the routine fabric of institutional activities. McKean's list includes
scientific management, financial analysis, consumer's research, market
research, operations research, and systems analysis.1 To these we could
add long range planning, research and development, industrial engineering,
PPBS, and futuristics. Currently several of these technologies (operations
research, systems analysis, and PPBS) are being integrated into the American
federal government and into many state and local governments.
For the purposes of this paper no particular distinction will be drawn
between these three, and all will be considered OR/MS (for operations re-
search -.management science). In common with other managerial technologies,
OR/MS has the following attributes: it is rationalistic, in that it assumes
that explicit human intelligence can lead to improvement: it is research
oriented; it involves esoteric techniques and uncommon cognitive perspectives;
it is oriented toward increasing the viability and effectiveness of complex
*This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 1970 convention of
and copyrighted by, the American Political Science Association. Reprinted
with permission. The research upon which this paper is based has been sup-
ported by NASA Grant #NGL 14-007-058 and a grant from the Boom-Allen-Bamilton
Foundation to the Cooperative International Program of Studies of Operations
Research and the Management Sciences, Graduate School of Management, North-
western University. Among the many people who have helped me, I am partic-
ularly indebted to Michael Radnor and Fred Vetter.
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organizations in increasingly complex environments; and, it leads to the
routine production of new ideas. Further, OR/MS shares with other managerial
technologies two organizational attributes: it is usually organized into
specialized organizational units and has been accompanied by a parallel
process of institutionalization in the academic world.2
Whether known as PPBS, systems analysis, or operations research
(each claims the others as either offsprings or siblings), the application
of these and related technologies has caused much controversy in federal
civilian agencies just as it has in defense and industrial settings. Among
others, the professional practitioners of OR/MS engage in vigorous and
spirited debate about their performance as a profession- Their writings
often contain the most broad, perceptive, and constructive of all criticisms
of OR/MS. However as James Schlesinger writes:3
Analysts themselves may be self-doubting, bemused by uncertainties,
frighteningly candid, but different tactics have been required of
the missionaries who have proselytized in behalf of analysis.
Consequently, Mosher and others find OR/hS oversold4, and there is a general
reaction against their hyperbolic claims. These practitioners, or analysts,
are often equally vigorous in their criticisms of the institutions which
employ them and the people and policies they find there. This is, of
course, as it should be; for analysts.are change-agents and their job is
constructive criticism. They are more than ordinary change agents also.
They are, in the phrase of Michael Radnor, "change-squared" agents. The
consequence of their activity is not only discrete changes but also change
in the way change itself occurs in institutional settings. OR/MS analysts
and OR/MS are thus doubly threatening. It should be no surprise that the
reaction to them is sharp and sometimes confused.
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Criticisms of OR/MS can be divided into those which are optimistic
and those which are pessimistic in the following sense. Some criticisms
seem to have as their underlying assumption that OR/MS will have a signif-
icant impact on public policy and organizational decision making. OR/MS
recommendations will be implemented and OR/MS analysts will achieve a
poeition of power and influence in important matters of state. Criticisms
making or implying this assumption shall be called optimistic. On the
other hand, many criticisms seem to assume that OR/MS will have little
or no impact. OR/MS recommendations will not be implemented and OR/MS
analysts will not achieve positions of power and influence. Criticisms
making or implying this assumption shall be called pessimistic. I shall
at times restate criticisms of OR/MS. In doing so there is some danger
that criticisms will be _taken beyond their authors' original intent.
The distortion is moderated in my view by the common organizational con-
sequences of the component OR/MS technologies. We shall treat the contro-
versy in the setting of federal civilian agencies and shall proceed with
comments on specific criticisms of OR/MS.
THE PESSIMISTIC CRITIQUE, PART I: IT CAN'T BE DONE
When most forthright, the pessimistic critique says that OR/MS is
5
simply impossible. Victor Thompson; writes:
I must be blunt: science cannot solve social problems. Suppose,
for example, that we ask medicine to solve the problem of race
prejudice. As a medical problem the 'Solution' might turn out to
be some drug. However the social problem would still remain.
The same holds true for the solutions of management scientists, the
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"econologists" who have seized the opportunity for power presented by PPBS.
Thompson continues:
The solution of a social problem is properly described with such
words as 'compromise', 'consensus', 'majority', 'negotiation',
'bargaining', 'coercion', etc. If the 'solution' cannot be
described in such terms, then it is not the solution of a social
problem.
Wildavsky reacts to PPBS in an equally abrupt manner: PPBS cannot be done
because no one knows how to do it.6
These are strong statements. It is obvious recommendations must be
implemented before they are 'solutions'. Or is it? A recommendation can
be implemented and still not be a solution. We have many cases of that.
And a recommendation need not be described in Thompson's vocabulary to be
a solution. There has been recently much writing on "incentives
"
'
7 Too
many of these incentives are within the discretion of administration for
Thompson's vocabulary to be given unqualified allegiance. But perhaps
this all is quibbling with words. Thompson's criticism is less inaccurate
than it is trivial. The statement that no one knows how to do PPBS, is
both inaccurate and trivial. PPBS was being done prior to 1965 in the
Defense Department' and in several large corporations and, in a prototype
form, in several federal civilian agencies as well. Whether the PPBS
that was or is practiced happens to meet some set of explicit personal
criteria is another matter, but Wildavsky does not offer such criteria.
If PPBS or some other form of OR/MS can be done, it can be misdone
as well. Wildavsky suggests that benefit-cost analyses can be "fudged"
by adding in benefits such as 'recreation' or through the manipulation
of the discount rate or through opportunistic aggregation.9 In a later
paper he castigates economists for adding in aesthetic factors in order
to make their analyses come out "right°1 0 James Schlesinger notes the
criticism of OR/MS in the Defense Department based on military fiascos
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like the TFX or the Viet-Nam (or is it 'S.E.A.') War, although he acquits
OR/MS of the charges.ll I once forced this very criticism upon a group
of civilian agency analysts and their response is appropriate here. They
argued that when and if this happened other analysts would step in and
let it be known. Professional critism would in most cases be sufficient
control. Professional criticism is also the channel through which Wildavsky
was able to learn about the methodological peculiarities which he notes.
OR/MS Criticized for Lack of Political and Social Realism
It is easiest to list some specifics and then list comments. (a)
Thompson feels that 'econologicians' "vastly underestimate the complexity
of the units with which they deal."1 2 (b) He also feels that they do not
consider adequately how people will react to the systems they design.l3
(c) Mosher feels that PPBS involves an oversimplifed view of the world,
one that is too market oriented.14 (d) Wildavsky feels that "economic
rationality, however laudable in its own sphere, ought not to swallow
up political rationality--but will do so if political rationality continues
to lack trained and adept defenders."1 5 (e) Fenno notes that many budget
reform proposals--more coordination, more integration, more comprehensive
consideration--are rejected by Congressmen not because Congress&mn are
less intelligent or less concerned with the public interest than anyone
else, but because they do not feel these reforms "are likely to help them
perform their function any better."16 (f) Wildavsky sees program budgeting
as tying the President's hands to five-year expenditure commitments while
Presidents like to maintain their freedom. 1 7
The environment of federal civilian programs is both complex and
reactive. It is reactive both in the market sense and in the game-theory
sense. Thompson's criticisms--(a) and (b)--represent serious obstacles
to OR/MS in any institution. They can be and are being overcome through
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the accumulation of experience and through the inclusion of a mix of pro-
fessional skills in analytical units. Yet the units with which politicians
or sociologists deal are also more complex than they realize; if they were
not, either our policies would be better or sociologists would be kings.
OR/MS may be econological rather than sociological, but the model
of economic man has proven itself to give, at least in this culture, more
consistently reliable predictions than any other.1 8 Political sensitivity
is important but attempts to breathe some useful life into this concept
have involved its explication in terms which OR/MS analysts find congenial:
political resources, exchange costs, and opportunity costs.l9 Wildavsky's
interpretation of 5-year expenditure projections as a politically unrealistic
attempt to tie the President's hands is unsupported by either practice or
theory; proof of political insensitivity need: to rest on more than that mis-
representation. These allegations discriminate neither among tactics .
appropriate for diverse political arenas (e.., Congress, bureaucracy,
community), nor between what Wildavsky distinguishes as "systems" and
"policy" politics.2 0 Fenno's comment (e) introduces the factor of purpose.
His notion is stated elegantly by two prominent management scientists in
21
an essay, the reception and wide circulation of which is evidence that
the analytical community has not neglected Fenno's point.
Even if OR/MS analysts are politically insensitive, they operate
in a bureaucratic environm.nt conducive to learni.g that skill. They
are, generally by choice, "on tap and not on top".2 2 This set of criticisms
is generally appropriate but hardly profound, in general it applies as
well to any human activity transcending epistemological andppolitical
fatalism.
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Critical Variables are not Measurable
This is a related criticism and has as a corollary the claim that,
consequently the analysts will solve the problem that remains after these
critical factors have been ignored. Thompson writes.2 3
The neo-Taylorites set up self-serving rules that assure their
being able to reach determinate solutions. That is, they solve
what problems they can, not the problems that most need to be
solved.
Both parts of this charge aretoo familiar to require further documentation.
It assumes that all problems which OR/MS analysts face are, in fact, unamen-
able to quantification of the most salient variables and that analysts are
unimaginative in their efforts at quantification. Neither of these assump-
tions is particularly true. Many problems in areas like housing
transportation, -banking, agriculture, and others involve the expression of
public preferences through market mechanisms. In reading critiques of this
type, one might assume that the government was involved only in mental
health, education, and efforts to increase human feelings of self-worth.
Further, many analysts are skillful users of behavioral measures.
In "soft" policy areas, primary goals may be measurable and the
"unmeasurable" goals only secondary at best. An illustrative cause celebre
is the Westinghouse Learning Corporation study of Head Start. Reflecting on
controversy, Williams and Evans state that it is necessary to limit the
scope of analytical studies.
Despite its many other objectives, in the final analysis Head
Start should be evaluated mainly on the extent to which it has
affected the life chances of the children.24
The key indicators of this were measures of enduring cognitive and motiva-
tional change. When enduring changes were found in a small fraction of
the previous studies which used these same measures, the critics of the -
Westinghouse study remained quiet. Williams and Evans conclude:2 5
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The milieu for meaningful program evaluation involves an inter-
action of methodology, bureaucracy, and politics; it will therefore
often be the case that attacks against evaluations will be made
which are methodological in form but ideological in concern.
There is a large amount of progress in the social sciences in the
measurement of variables long felt to be immeasurable. The problem is rarely
that variables cannot be quantified nor even that analysts will not try
when they can be; sometimes rather it is that politicians will not allow
the use of the behavioral sciences measuring instruments that are available2 6
Wildavsky has commented in several places on the problem of making
interpersonal comparisons of utility. He notes that "public works projects
have a multitude of objectives and consequences" and that "no single welfare
function can encompass these diverse objectives."2 7
'"No one knows how to deal with interpersonal comparisons of utility." 28
"The process we have developed for dealing with interpersonal compar-
isons in government is not economic but political."2 9
Anti-Pluralists like McConnell and Wolff show that in American politics
explicit interpersonal comparisons of utility are avoided through a variety
of institutional and ideological mechanisms.3 0 Yet giving the marginal
dollar to the SST rather than to OEO makes the comparison anyway, in effect.
Perhaps the critics fear making comparisons explicit. If so, then they
ought to reject all valid knowledge from policy making. OR/MS can contribute
usefully to an understanding of means-edds relations and of relations among
ends. It cannot produce algorithmic solutions to complex value choices:
although it changes the argument, it does not replace politics. For the
latter, OR/NS should not be faulted.
Costs of Calculation
Bertram Gross, among others, has alerted us to the danger of "paralysis
by analyis". 3 1 Wildavsky has argued that "policy analysis is expensive
in terms of time, talent, and money",3 2 and he criticizes the "paper pushing"
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aspects of PPBS--program structures, PM's and PFP's. He writes approvingly
in his study of zero-base budgeting of such calculation aids as "what Congress
would approve, what the statutes required, what could be done with available
resources."3 3 In The Politics of the Budgetary Process he even offers the
example of the voter's use of party preference as the type of calculation
short-cut to be admired.3 4 Yet problems can be over-studied, and politicians
have developed devices for intentional paralysis.3 5 Wildavsky's criticisms
of".paper pushing" were anticipated by Budget Bureau action.3 6 The simplicity
of calculation in.present policy making and budgeting procedures may be
overrated. Clearly there is a lot of calculation going on, as one year's
collection of budget hearings, Congressional Records, and agency studies
would testify. One must assume that Congressmen and agency officials
actively seek information and might well like better information than they
have. Through screening and filtering processes, these officials might
well find a way to drop the least valuable item of information from their
attention list and replace it with something better. At the same time, some
of the calculation aids listed by Wildavsky become less useful upon in-
spection. Statutes are often not very clear and judges spend years deter-
mining what the law is.3 7 'What can be dons with available personnel and
resources" is also not so easy to discover, and this is one reason why
operations researchers command GS-14 and -15 slots in Washington. Whether
OR/MS in any of its forms adds an unbearable burden of calculation is
contingent upon whether it replaces or supplements other calculations.
It may be that it at first supplements and then replaces other calculations.
Redundance would seem an advisable interim tactic,and the general criticism
is probably a function of the temporary novelty of new ways of making
decisions rather than a permanent fixture.
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Each of the preceding criticisms suggests that OR/MS in civilian
government is either impossible or not worth the effort. Some of them
are trivial and undeserving of sustained discussion as posed. Other
arguments are dependent for their relevance on the fast-disappearing
novelty of OR/MS or upon an inadequate appreciation of OR/MS io a social
context. Some of the criticisms are fast losing their relevance because
of the actions taken by analysts before the criticisms became widespread
outside of professional analytical circles. But each deserves consideration
for its social function. Even those who argue that OR/MS is impossible
may, as they provide needed elaboration of their critiques, stimulate
better performance on the part of analysts and more realistic expectations
about OR/MS on the part of political decision makers.
THE PESSIMISTIC CRITIQUE, PART II: NO IMPROVEMENT
It is not enough to say that OR/MS is difficult or impossible. Were
we not accustomed to it, the way that decisions are currently made might
also seem impossible. The second half of theppessimistic critique states
that even though OR/MS is possible, it will not be an improvement upon
present methods. Present methods for making decisionsare far more rational
than they appear, the argument continues. Whereas Wildavsky is the best
known proponent of the first part of the pessimistic critique, Charles E.
Lindblom is identified intimately with the second. His writings have
opened new areas of inquiry in more than one discipline3 8 and have won
deserved acclaim. Five themes run through his work from his early articles
to the present, and for the sake of brevity most references will be to
well-known and widely circulated articles.
Failure of Comprahensiveuess
The first theme is the inadequacy of central coordination and com-
prehensive inquiry. Each concept. according to Lindblom, suffers from a
failure to account for man's limited capacities for calculation and in-
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formation processing and from the frequent impossibility of casting a problem
into a means-ends framework.3 9 Lindblom offers a caricature of synoptic
rationality that approximates the recommendations offered by some budgetary
reformers and writers of textbooks in administrative practice.4 0 The
outlines are familiar. He ascribes it to OR/MS advocates and thus it
becomes of interest here. In making this ascription Lindblom has, I feel,
made a fundamental error. To see why, it is necessary to distinguish three
uses of the comprehensive model: (1) as an ideal for the socio-political
solution of problems; (2) as an ideal in individual inquiry; (3) as a
model for reconstructed logic. Used as either (1)
or (2) the model may be impossible. But that does not mean it is worthless.
Rather, the comprehensive model is best seen as a checklist: the analyst
evaluates his own work or social and political decision processes to see
if they can be reconstructed in the comprehensive model. Making the recon-
struction is a way of checking to see what has been left out, and therefore
the reconstruction provides a basis for an incremental process of planning
and inquiry. Iv other words, the comprehensive model is a discipline, as
is suggested by Roger Jones's comnents on Lindblom and by the research
project histories collected by Hammond.4 1 The failure to see the compre-
hensive model as the discipline of reconstructed logic can lead one to
view OR/MS as inferior, particularly for large scale problems.4 2
Superiority of Incrementalism
Incrementalism refers both to a strategy for policy development and
to a strategy for social change. Lindblom writes:4 3
The incremental method is characterized by its practitioner's
preoccupation with: (1) only that limited set of policy alter-
natives that are politically relevant, these typically being policies
only incrementally different from existing policies: (2) analysis
of only those aspects of policies with respect to which the alter-
natives differ; (3) a view of the policy choice as one in a succession
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of choices; (4) the marginal values of various social objectives and
constraints; (5) an intermixture of evaluation and empirical analysis
of the consequences of policies for objectives independently deter-
mined; and (6) only a small number out of all the important relevant
values.
Supposedly, policy making proceeding in this fashion will be more rational
than that which emerges from a more comprehensive analysis. The incremental
model has been applied most frequently to budgeting.44 Yet Congressional
budgeting can be modeled adequately by a few linear equations, a fact which
lead Otto Davis to testify that:4 5
... one can abolish the appropriations comittees. They are not
needed because their behavior is even more predictable than the
executive branch's behavior.
Such a predictable system may not be all bad; its rationality is somewhat
elusive however.
Justifications of the superiority of either incremental or "compre-
hensive" processes usually have the same defect: they ignore output and
concentrate on secondary criteria.46 No process can justify the egregious
policies which have happened to us incrementally, such as our farm programs,
urban renewal, and the "Viet-Nam" war. Incrementalism seems particularly
inappropriate in situations where some objectives are far more important than
others; for over time other, less relevant, objectives may become equally
well served. Subsidy programs also can be distorted more easily and less
noticeably through incremental than through "comprehensive" processes.
Lastly, in incremental processes undesirable side effects may become
institutionalized. The value of the comprehensive approach as reconstructed
logic can be seen here. It builds in an evaluation of consequences of both
kinds: are we reaching our goals, and are we having unintended consequences?
At its best, incrementalism is more than a strategy for policy
making that ignores consequences and outputs. It can also be an experi-
mental epistemology in the sense discussed by Karl Popper in his interesting
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essay, "On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance". Well-known man-
agement scientists interpret OR/MS in much the same way. 4 8 We approximate
knowledge through continual "conjectures and refutations". We contin-
ually examine purpose and proposals logically and empirically because we
are faced with multiple goals and changing environments for all our inter-
esting problems. If incrementalism at its best is superior to OR/MS, it
is because its involvement of a wider number of actors in the conjecture
and refutation process leads to better output.
Incrementalism and Participation
If we must evaluate policy on the basis of output-we can still look
at participation under the hypothesis that scope of participation is posi-
tively related to quality of output. Pluralist doctrine assures us that
all relevant interests will be represented. Wildavsky discusses how altru-
istic citizens, entrepreneurial politicians, and imperialistic bureaucrats
will make sure of that.49 Yet we know that there are strictly technical
barriers to interest mobilization and organization, and I hope that we
know that politicians and bureaucrats have effective ways of suppressing
or ignoring some interests. 50 Some political arenas are effectively closed
to large segments of the public; for example, most of administrative law.
Analysis is one method which can be used to include in the policy making
process interests and potential or real consequences which would otherwise
be neglected. In this way analysis may be superior to incrementalism even
when incrementalism is working at its best. The analyst is not only a
51
"partisan efficiency advocate',5 but may also be an advocate of otherwise
unrepresented interests.
Goals, Meaas. and Agreement
Yes, the devotee of Lindblom's writings will answer, but what about
the problem of getting agreement. There is, supposedly, some value in not
making one's goals explicit in the political process: unstated values and
-14
ideologies do not prevent agreement on marginal values or on means: con-
sidered in actual choice situations, alternatives may weigh in differently
than they do in the abstract.5 2 f As an ethical statement that'is far more
appropriate to the marketing of vegetables than it is for the expenditure
of tax money..
At the same time analysis, while requiring explicit statements of
goals, does not compel their appearance on the front page of the Washington
Post. They need not be known beyond the agency. The goals of the analyst
can be and often are tactically concealed.
Goals often change through the consideration of means. This is
true in OR/MS and in incrementalism. This in itself is not an argument
for keeping goals hidden from the outset. It may be the reverse: the
conjecture and refutation process may be facilitated if goals are stated.
One large class of decisions where this may be true are those over which
interaction can be described an "analyticale rather than "bargaining"..5 4
Even if this is not the situation, we are still not in a position to assert
the superiority of incrementalism. Both game theory and classical economics
gain validity the more people know about them. 5
The argument that goals should not be made explicit has another aspect.
Lowi has argued that part of the current national malaise results from the
government's failure to state and pursue explicit goals. Contemporary
laws are written as broad and rather empty statements of good intentions,
and the government itself becomes only one of many interests contesting
to determine what the specific goals will bell (This fact implies, of
course, that it is easier to get agreement on ends than on means!) It is
clear that the incrementalist position on stating goals is more than a
methodological recommendation or even a neutral political recommendation.
Rather, it is 'part and parcel of the dominant American "public philosophy"
of "interest group liberalism". The OR/MS position on stating goals is at
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this time still an exclusively methodological one; it has not been linked
to an articulated political philosophy.57 It has political implications,
however, and therefore the relative superiority of either incremental
or OR/MS approaches to political decision making can be resolved on only
partially technical grounds.
Coercion and Incentives
We cannot dismiss the notion of conflict yet however, Elsewhere
Theodore Lowi has noted the paradox that in recent years, political scien-
tists writing about policy making have ignored coercion while many econo-
mists writing about the same topic find coercion important. 58 Lindblom
is concerned with removing coercion more conventionally because of its
inefficiency. He argues for the manipulation of a price system rather than
the use of production quotas or priority rationing as a means of achieving
national economic goals. If price systems are recognized as separate from
free markets they will be seen as important aids to rational administration.5" 
In an earlier book he and Dahl write that a price system involved "spon-
taneous field control" which is, paradoxically, "both tyrannical and free".60
For the decade of the 1970's the term is, rather, "incentives". Incentives
are superior to central administration because they are cheaper and easier
to operate, and probably more efftctive.61 Former Budget Director Schultze
finds that the manipulation of incentives is essential for the implementation
of policies involving dispersed and delegated power and program operation.
Yet the incentives are difficult to design and demand a careful attention
to goals.6 2 Former O.E.O. planner Robert Levine concludes that a cost
of using incentives systems arises from their potential for individual
abuse. While net losses may be small, they still must be controlled. Yet
it is OR/MS that offers the models and techniques suitable for this task.6 3
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If a price or incentives system (an idea that derives from the incrementalist
argument) is superior to an administered system (an idea more commonly
associated with planners and OR/MS analysts), the former cannot be effective
without large inputs from the management sciences both in design and operation.
Several more brief comments about Lindblom's ideas and their relation
to OR/MS are necessary before this section can be summarized. (1) the
incrementalist approach is under attack from "anti-pluralists" as leading
to unjust policy outcomes.64 That systemic morality results from the morality
of the sub-systems seems a fundamental assumption of contemporary pluralist
thought. This has been challenged outside of the partisan confines of the
pluralist.= antipluralist debate by the philosopher and management scientist
C. West Churchman 6and deserves greater attention than it has received
from "incrementalists'". (2) Central coordination is a concept which needs
rethinking. The design and implementation of incentives systems assumes
a greater degree of centralization than is normally considered desirable
in incrementalist arguments. Dahl and Lindblom's early comments on the
tyranny of "spontaneous field control" should be revived. (3) There have
been important improvements in the methodology of systems design. Lindblom's
writings have certainly been seminal. Simon's discussion of "nearly decom-
posable systems" implies the possibility of significant simplification
in social design.6 6 Finally, Forrester argues that too often we mistake
coincident symptoms for cause and that incremental adjustment is based on
the logic of first-order,nagative-feedback systems. But all social systems
are "high-order, multiple-loop, non-linear feedback structures" which
require for their management the discovery of completely nonobvious rela-
tionships. Failure to appreciate this may lead designers (including poli-
ticians) to make heavy-handed and counter-effective interventions when minor
but unobvious - adjustments would be effective..6 7 The strategy of incremental
policy change may simply be intellectually inadequate unless supplemented by
prior,- more comprehensive analysis.
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The case for incrementalism rests upon a failure to distinguish
reconstructed logic from a design algorithm, and upon a dogmatic moral
perspective. When both incrementalism and OR/KS are properly conceived,
the two are often complementary and sometimes identical in part. Where they
differ, the superiority of incrementalis even on the criteria chosen by
its advocates, is in every case questionable. Incrementalism as a strategy
of policy change,:'rather than as a method of inquiry and debate, may depend
on significant OR/MS inputs. Finally, recent developments in the metho-
dology of systems design make possible more comprehensive analysis and
coordination. These developments include the significant and articulate
contributions of Lindblom and other incrementalists.
THE OPTIMISTIC CRITIQUE
The major component of the optimistic critique is the perceived effect
of OR/MS on governmental institutions and, specifically, the effects of PPBS
and analysis on budgetary politics. Wildavsky makes the strongest statements
on this topic in his belated discovery that PPBS affects policy by affecting
the way decisions are made ("system polkticsn).6g
My contention is that the thrust of program budgeting makes it an
integral part of system politics.
Having discovered this fact, Wildavsky appears convinced of the impending
disaster. Yet "system politics" have been effectively practiced by com-
mercial interests. Walton Hamilton, in arguing that industry has been the
major source of 20th century constitutional innovations in America- makes
it clear that he is writing about "system politics'.. 69 Congressional
committees even play system politics with PPBS by withholding funds and
positions for department-level PPBS staffs,7 0 a practice consistent with
"the traditional unwillingness to allow the Office of the Secretary to be
properly staffed".7 1
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Perhaps the feat is not so much of "system politics" as it is of
program budgeting itself. Budgeting involves questions of who shall prevail
regarding what is in the budget: 72
If we substitute the words 'what the government ought to do' for
the words 'ought to be in the budget' it becomes clear that a
normative theory of budgeting would be a comprehensive and specific
political theory detailing what the government's activities ought
to be at a particular time.
Normative budget theories are "totalitarian" in Wildavsky's view. His
conclusion demands from such theories a degree of precise elaboration that
neither exists nor is forthcoming and again there seems some overreaction.
All normative budget theories, including Wildavsky's own defense of the
budget practice that currently obtains, have the consequence of indulging
some and depriving others in fairly regular patterns. One is left with
the suspicion that Wildavsky's fears rest p9n unstated, undefended policy
and constitutional preferences.
Fenno also argues that "no budgetary reform is neutral". Be feels
that the appropriations process is the key source of the House's power and
that its members realize that budget reforms begun in the executive, branch
are threatening to them. Consequently, Congressmen will, and those sym-
pathetic to them should, scrutinize PPBS for its effects on the power of the
purse. 73 Otto Davis, however, finds that Congress follows executive budget
proposals so closely that: 74
.... If one is worried about the implication of PPB for Conggessiosal
control, and if one thinks that the additional complexities in the
budgetary process caused by PPB Analysis might in some way cause
Congress to lose control of the budgetary process, then one is
really worrying about a fictitious issue.
OR/NS, if used by Congressmen, might have an effect opposite to what Wildavsky
and Fenno anticipate: It might strengthen Congressional control by directing
it to important policy issues.
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Several other fears are included in the optimistic critique. One
is that OR/MS will lead to a major increase in political conflict. This
is a reasonable deduction from some of Dahl's work-7 5 and has been discussed
under the second part of the pessimistic critique. The counter-arguments
would be essentially similar. Another is more apocalyptic. Bertram Gross
counters the suggestion the PPB methods will lead to "professionalization,
laWOcale institutionalization, and 'depolitization' of politics through
monopoly by technocratic politics of what Wildavsky calls 'total efficiency'
rationality". He suggests that in the context of the development of "post-
industrial service:societies", present day systems analysis may be seen
as one of the technological factors that tend to promote disorder and dis-
continuity rather than social systematization.7 6 He continues: 77
The diffusion of systems analysis of the more narrow variety could
provoke continued enlargement of anti-institutional politics--par-
ticularly if systems analysis used (sic) by political leaders as
window dressing for a 'welfare- warfare State'.
Such hyperbolic language is hard to take seriously. It sounds like a stump
speech in the vagueness of its rhetoric. At the same time, the claims
offered on behalf of systems analysis are so extensive as to be, I hope,
ridiculous on even casual inspection. Is systems analysis really neces-
sary for a "welfare-,warfare State"? I think not.
In general, preoccuption of both critics and advocates of OR/MS
with the budget process has been misplaced. First, much of the government's
activity is funded through: (a) trust funds; (b) permanent and indefinite
appropriations (interest on national debt); (c) fixed charges (expenditures
determined by eligibility requirements and/or statutory formulae like
VeteranA benefits); and (d) ongoing projects (what does the government
do with half a bridge?) 7 8 Fenno notes (e) public debt transactions as
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another way of circumventing the budget process.
'
7 9 Combined, these alter-
natives include about half of the annual federal expenditures. But this
half is amenable to analysis even if it is not effectively in the budget.
Secondly, budgeting is more complex as well as less relevant for
the use of OR/MS than it first appears. Schick ascribes three functions
to budgets (planning, management, and control) and contends that: 88
Multipurpose budget systems are a vital part of the future of
budgeting. Although many of the problems have not been solved or
even recognized, budgeting in the future will not be able to
neglect its planning role or abandon its investment in control
and management.
The use of the budget as in instrument of rational policy choice is in
practice reconciled to these other functions.
Of course, the amount of money appropriated does have an impact on
what the consequences of a program will be. Particularly with a new program,
the budget process is often critical. In general, Fenno observes, "the
separation between appropriations and legislation is difficult to maintain." S!
Yet maintained to a large degree it is, according to his maimoth study of
the appropriations process. 82 There are institutional norms and enforceable
expectations concerning policy making by the appropriations committees.
Critical decisions are made in authorization committees which jealously
guard their policy making prerogatives. Further, much critical policy
has a high degree of independence from appropriations (e.g. rules governing
the sale of securities or rules for tax accounting). In discussing the
impact cr possibility of OR/MS the fixation upon the budget process is
misplaced.
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE ANALYSIS OF ANALYSIS
OR/MS must be seen as a complex phenomenon. It penetrates throughout
the federal establishment, and no single defect will significantly retard
its diffusion. Because it is complex, its affects upon the government
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and society cannot be captured in felicitous phrases or catchwords. We come to
Charles Schultz's more realistic question of how OR/MS can fit into the
political decision process. 83
Schultze offers some hypotheses about which kinds of programs will
be, politically, the most feasible to analyze. He concludes:8 4
.... analysis can operate with fewer constraints and can profit from
consideration of a wider range of alternatives in programs that
produce a pure public good and do not directly affect the structure
of institution and political power than in programs that produce
a quasi-public good, fundamentally affect income distribution, or
impinge on the power structure.
He notes, a bit forlornly, that the programs for which there is the greatest
relevance of market criteria as well as the best data and prior theoretical
and empirical work are just those programs which involve income subsidies
to powerful groups. 85 A corollaryis that analysis will be more feasible
for new and rapidly expanding programs than it will be for these subsidy
programs 86
Wildavsky suggests: 87
Policy analysis is facilitated when: (a) goals are easily specified,
(b) a large margin of error is allowable, (c) the cost of the con-
templated policy makes large expenditures on analysis worthwhile.
Some exceptions may be taken; regarding costs, for example, OR/MS has been
applied to such minor government activities as the helium program at the
direction of the Budget Bureau.8 8 But these propositions represent a first
step toward an empirical evaluation of the potential for analyzing government
programs systematically.
A second new direction involves the listing of preconditions for the
success of an OR/MS staff in an organization. Mosher and Harr find that
the following conditions facilitated the use of PPBS in the Department of
Defense: (a) the many prior years of analytical work and the many available
and experienced defense analysts; (b) clarity of theDOD mission; (c) the
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strength, abilities, and sympathies of the Secretary; (d) a relatively simple
appropriations structure; and (e) a bias toward the procurement of hardware.
In the civilian agencies, in contrast, all these conditions are reversed
and, further (a) mission boundaries differ from organization ones; (b)
measures of objectives are hard to obtain; (c) programs often involve grants
or loans to spenders outside the immediate control of the agency; and (d)
political feedback is immediate and ubiquitous.8 ' Reflecting this excellent
list against the conclusions from their study of programming systems in the
State Department, one finds almost complete discrepency. Aside from legal
and personal leadership weaknesses, Mosher and Harr find that intra-organi-
zational, inter-group, and inter-personal factors were responsible for the
failure of the programming innovations they studied. Chance, expressed
in external events and in the location of key personalities, was also a
factor.9 0 In other words, they find that the real barriers to OR/MS are
the same ones common to all attempted organizational change. The conclusion
I draw from this is that most discussions of why the civilian agencies cannot
do PPBS (Schultze's comments above are an exception) are either lists of
temporary obstacles or, worse, simply irrelevant. In the former category
fit most discussions of technical obstacles and in the latter fit most
discussions derived from pluralist dogma.
We can begin to see the importance of organizational factors even
more surely when the recommendations for improving OR/MS in civilian govern-
ment are revealed. Take, for example, some of the recommendations of Aaron
Wildavsky. He advocates "policy analysis" or management science supplemented
with behavioral sciences.9 1 For his policy analysis units, Wildavsky recom-
mends spending only half of their time on short-range projects with the
other half reserved for long-range analyses. He is sensitive to the tension
between organizational demands for immediate results and the mission of
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long-range analysis. He recommends that the policy analysis unit report
"directly to the Secretary or the agency head" to show that it "is meant
to be taken seriously". Policy analysis must have the support of agency
top management, and policy analysis should be "geared to the direct require-
ments of top management.""9 1 Each of these recommendations shares a common
attribute: they could be found in just about any of hundreds of articles
on how to start an operations research group which appeared in trade,
engineering, and management journals around the world during the past
twenty-five years.93 This is like saying, however, that the recommendations
are truisms with all the wisdom--but also the validity--that truisms offer.
Each of these recommendations can be evaluated against the insights derived
from several years of studying OR/MS staffs. 9 4 Following is an example. of such
an evaluation.
It is rare that an OR/MS staff has complete control over the fraction
of tts time that it allocates to long-range studies. The priority problems
of management, the legitimacy accorded to the research mission by managers,
the technical skills of the analysts, their familiarity with organizational
problems and procedures, and the extent to which they have developed stable
relations of understanding and confidence with top and operating management
all affect the way they allocate their time. The impact of each of these
factors varies with the location of the staff in what is actually a lengthy
(as much as 10 years) process of becoming integrated into the organization.
Only the best OR/MS staffs, then, are able to control-their own time; "best"
refers to technical skills, a record of proven results, and adroit staff
leadership. Even such a staff is likely to devote a significant part of
its time to matters that cannot even be considered short-term projects.
There will be a continuing need to service requests for advice with a turn-
around time of 48 hours or less. By doing so the staff builds and maintainss
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the confidence which managers have in it.- Long-term projects tend to
be allowed under either of two circumstances: the managers do not under-
stand what the staff should be doing, or the staff has reached an advanced
stage of development. The latter, as has been implied, requires a careful
cultivation of relationships with operating managers unless the staff works
only for top management. But that option is possible only if the staff
needs little or no cooperation from operating managers in the collection
of data or the implementation of recommendations. The fraction of time
devoted to long-range analysis projects also depends on the way in which
the staff has developed. An OR/MS staff may attempt to compel radical
changes in organizational goals or procedures; alternatively, it may accept
the rates of change imposed upon it by the managers in the organization.
Sometimes it will be forced to choose the latter option because its presence
will not be tolerated otherwise. The whole question of how time will be
allocated among projects with different time frames is about as important
as any question one could ask about an OR/MS staff. It cannot be decided
by fiat, especially from outside the organization, and the specific figure
of 50 percent long-term and 50 percent short-term even if taken as an approximation is
unlikely to result from anything but chance.
In other words, policy analysis brings us back to where we began.
A new managerial technology is emerging. It is really new only in its
organizational setting, and not all that new there either. Policy analysis
is management science for the civilian government, and its emergence in
the academic cloisters of political science is evidence that management
science--or policy analysis if you wish--is now having that parallel insti-
tutionalization in the relevant academic areas which has been characteristic
of all managerial technologies. At the same time, "policy analysis" is
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evidence that the future of analysis in civilian government is assured and
that organization theorists and other students of public organizations
can move from the ideological debate over whether OR/MS can work to the
scientific study of how OR/MS analysts behave in organizations and how
organizations react to their presence.
NEW WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT POLICY-MAKING
Our understanding of the role of analysis in political decision
making will be improved if policy making systems are appreciated in ways
different from those current in political science today.
1. The dominant frame of appreciation is one derived from pluralist
theory and incremental models of decision processes. Like 'Professor
Easton's Political Science",9 5 the pluralist-incremental frame of appreciation
is devoid of either social or ethical content.9 6 OR/NS advocates, however
adequately, have shown themselves to be concerned with the ethics of policy
substance9 7 although they have been less sensitive to the social dimensions
of policy implementation. 98 Lowi has pioneered in the use of policy attri-
butes as independent variables in the study of policy making processes. 99
We need to expand upon his categories and begin to look at more specific
attributes of policy, such as specificity of means, amount of delegation,
complexity, and specificity of goals for their behavioral implications.
The analysis of the social and ethical consequences of law seems considerably
more vital both within and outside of the discipline. That the substance
of policy itself has behavioral implications is the first thing that should
be added to our frame of appreciation.
2. We must therefore change our image of policy making processes
in another way. Unlike most organization theorists , 00political scientists
have long perceived that decision making is a process of developing a
coalition which is large enough to enforce its will upon those who, for
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whatever reason, disagree with it. The coalition agrees on a commitment to
take specific actions in the future, possibly only under certain contin-
gencies. Decisions and policies have futures! After the decision has been
madeb there is a process of maintaining and revising the commitment. First
there is the dimension of to what individual and institutional actors are
committed. Pluralist-incremental models suggest that members of the coa-
lition will have different conceptions of the commitment and that these
conceptions will change as their knowledge of its implications increases, as
changes occur in the environment, and as their other social roles impinge upon
coalition members. Second, there is the dimension of the composition of
the coalition. In implementing the commitment, some members will drop
out, but other must be added. For example, one of the problematical features
of many recent laws is that for their successful implementation, the coalition
must be expanded to include multitudinous state and local officials. This
expansion of the coalition is difficult to execute and occasions much of
the current discussion of "incentive systems" as has been noted. 101 Atten-
tion to the half of policy making that occurs after the coalition has reached
agreement is a necessary addition to the frame of appreciation of both
pluralist-incremental theorists and to OR/xS analysts.
3. Policy making processes are not just divided into pre- and post-
decision phases. There are a series of decisions in a policy making process,
and mostdecisions are neglected in favor of the study of the major policy making process
This is not a plea for the use of a decision making paradigm such as that
suggested by Polsby:10 2 initiation, incubation, formulation, etc. Rather,
the stimulus here is the work of Bachrach and Baratz. We should begin looking
at policy making with the question of initiation, but the next step is not
incubation. It is a decision to make any decision at all. The next step,
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once a decision to decide has been made, is a decision on whether or not
to proceed to a resolution of the issue. Most issues which are raised are
probably not resolved in a way at all favorable to the initiators. The
response may be, instead, repression, a court fight, a circulation of the
issue to someone else, a request for further study, a barrage of propaganda
and symbolic reassurance, etc. This part of the policy making process has
been studied most carefully by those scholars concerned with the poor and
other politically powerless.lq 3 But it is equally relevant for the study
of OR/MS analysts in government. They, too, can be given a "run-around",
or be given symbolic reassurances. Their work can be ignored if there is
a decision made that no decision will be made on their proposal. Vince
Davis' 1 0 4 study of innovations in the Navy is a pioneer attempt to analyze
the multi-phase decision process that envelops innovative proposals in
organizations, and further work should be done on this important aspect
of public administration.
4. It is easy to assume, on the basis of pluralist-incrementalist
literature, that bargaining is the essence of policy making and that know-
ledge and the quest for knowledge plays little, if an) part in it. Even
Lindblom, who acknowledges the importance of knowledge in policy making,
quietly makes bargaining and coalition the central focus of his descriptive
essay on policy making.1 0 5 Policy making is, however, a search for some
form of truth as well as a search for some agreement among partisan and
self-interested actors.1 0 6 Pluralist incremental models sell politicians
short. Through the adversary process, in their own way, they search for
knowledge about the social system, about human behavior, about economic
laws, about the relation of science to society, and other matters. If, in
Rivers and Harbors, analysis is used to make incremental adjustments on
political bargains, perhaps in other areas of policy--welfare, some aspects
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of transportation, housing, education, and macro-economics are possibilities--
bargaining is used to make incremental adjustments on analytical recomm-
dations. The salience of knowledge in different policy areas is a new topic
for research,and the conception of policy making processes as searches for
knowledge is the fourth needed addition to our appreciation of these processes.
IMPLICATIONS OF A ROSY FUTURE
If none of the arguments against OR/MS in civilian politics are
particularly valid, and the key factors determining its success are intra-
organizational ones, what does this tell us about American society and its
policy making processes? First, it suggests that most of us, particularly
those who are not part of the emerging student "counter-culture", accept
the economic model of man that underlies OR/MS. The suggestion has two
parts. One is that we tend to be predominantly responsive to reinforcement
schedules based on economic incentives and expect others to be likewise.
The other part is that in the design of policy we tend to think exclusively
in terms of economic means. The pluralist political philosophy has largely
eliminated the alternatives of coercion from the active consideration of
policy makers and most other Americans;J07 Deeply rooted democratic values
make us resistant to the use of propaganda and psychological manipulation
as overt policy instruments except in those policy areas where our national
phobia regarding Communism is operative. That, of course, is no small
exception. A third alternative, policy means based'on humane social and
interpersonal incentives is currently not realistically available. While
politicians have long manipulated these kinds of factors in pernicious ways--
e.g. racism--a social science adequate for use in the design of policy
means has been developing only since the 1930's. (Economic science
has a head start of over 150 years if it is dated from Adam Smith.) This
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alternative is developing in feasibility quite rapidly. Applitations of
social science in business organizations are becoming more common daily.
This leads to the second implication of the apparently bright future
for OR/MS, one that can be raised but not answered. If OR/MS is having
the future, one can ask why? Wildavsky is certainly right when he argues
that budget reforms are not neutral. To shed some light on this question,
let me propose two variables. Each is admittedly empirically problematic:
L. The effect of OR/MS on the distribution of political power; 2. The
effect &f governmental decisions on society. For the purposes here they can
each be dichotomized to yidld the following table.
Figure 1
Effect of Governmental
Decision on Society
A B
C D
Effect of OR/MS on
Political Power
A society can be changed significantly and its power structure remain
largely the same. If OR/MS fits the situation described by lox A, that
means that OR/MS reinforces an existing structure of power even if it leads
to other important changes. For example, OR/MS might contribute to the
design of construction techniques and incentives for homebuilding that would
revolutionize American residence standards. These same designs could lead
to concentration of the presently fragmented homebuilding industry into
-30-
large economic units controlled by the same numerically large but fractionally
small financial and managerial elite which controls most other large economic
enterprises. These organizations could be just as powerful politically
as the present homebuilding industry. To the extent that the existing
distribution of power is based upon the continued salience of a value
structure based on economic incentives, Box A is a real possibility! OR/MS
might succeed because it augments an existing distribution of power.
As we are considering the use of OR/MS in federal civilian government,
Box D is irrelevant. Lowi's analysis of the American political system as
one in which the government is just one of many interest groups (and often
not the most powerful one) 109implies that Box C describes the situation.
Government decisions have little effect on the distribution of power. OR/MS
may succeed because it is irrelevant to political power.
OR/MS could fit Box B; the counter-arguments to the optimistic
critique of OR/MS suggest this as the least probable of the alternatives.
Analysis of the half of policy making that occurs after the coalition
has reached agreement should also suggest that this is a low probability
alternative.1 1 0 The optimistic critique can be inadequate and still not
exhaust the issue it raises however. In the immediate future, the impact
of OR/MS on society through its role in governmental decision making will
likely be slight. The question remains unanswered in the longer run even
if certain alternatives can be eliminated.
CONCLUSION
It is conceivable that the consequences of many laws are not the
ones intended by the legislators who passed them. There is no a priori
reason to assume that the majority of Congress intended farm programs to
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have the redistributional effects which they have clearly had,Ill for example.
It is possible that if policy makers had different kinds of knowledge readily
available, that policies themselves would be different. We have at this time
no adequate understanding of the impact of knowledge on policy. In'fact,
we know very little about the relations between attributes of the policy
making process and their consequences, in terms of either policies on paper
or policies in action. Until we know something about these relationships,
we will know very little about American politics. Pluralist-incremental
doctrine, because' it directs us away from questions of substance, suppresses
this whole line of inquiry. Incremental models of policy making taken
instead as description facilitate this line of inquiry by delineating attri-
butes of policy making processes. The study of the impact of OR/MS on
political decision making, properly conceived and executed, is as likely a place
as any to start the study of the impact of knowledge on policy and, through
this, of the relation between process and substance in American politics.
FOOTNOTES
1. Roland N. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis,
with Emphasis on Water Resources Development, ORSA Publications in
Operations Research No. 3 (New York: John Wiley, 1958), pp. 6-7.
2. See the suggestive paper by Terry Clark, "Institutionalization of
Innovations in Higher Education: Four Models", Administrative Science
Quarterly 13:1 (June, 1968) pp. 1-25
3. James R. Schlesinger, "Uses and Abuses of Analysis", memorandum prepared
at the request of the Subcommittee on National Security and Interna-
tional Operations, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968. p. 5.
4. Frederick C. Mosher, "Limitations and Problems of PPBS in the States",
Public Administration Review 29:2 (March, 1969), p. 160.
5. Bureaucracy and Innovation (University: University of Alabama Press,
1969), p. 57.
6. Aaron Wildavsky, "Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS", Public Admin-
istrationReview, 29:2 (March, 1969) pp. 193-194. Hereafter cited as
RPA.
7. This will be discussed infra with appropriate citations.
8. In the sense that zero is a trivial solution for the equation, X3 -4X=0.
9. Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency", (Public Admin-
istration Review 26:4 (Dec., 1966) pp. 292-310) reprinted in James
W. Davis, ed., Politics, Programs, and Budgets (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1969) p. 235. Hereafter cited as PEE.
10.. "Aesthetic Power or the Triumph of the Sensitive Minority over the
Vulgar Mass: A Political Analysis of the New Economics", Daedelus
96:4 (Fall, 1967) p. 1118.
Footnotes, page 2
11. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 3.
12. Thompson, op. cit., p. 54.
13. ibid., pp. 53, ff.
14. Nosher, op. cit., pp. 161 - 162.
15. PEE, p. 252.
16. Richard Fenno, "Comment," in Robert L. Chartrand, et. al., eds.,
Information Support, Program Budgeting, and the Congress (New York:
Spartan Books, 1968), p. 214.
17. PEE, p. 247.
18. I shall not elaborate now on the social and political implications
of that statement here except to note that there are societies where
the statement would have far less validity. This tells us something
about the possible effectiveness of OR/MS solutions as well as
something about American culture.
19. Specifically, Wildavsky, PEE; Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1961), Books IV and V; Edward N. Epstein, The
Corporation in American Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
20. PEE, p. 246.
21. C. W. Churchman and A. H. Schainblatt, '"The Researcher and the Manager:
A Dialectic of Implementation," Management Science 11:4 (February, 1965),
pp. B-69 to B-88.
22. In my interviews I have twice come across instances where OR/MS groups
were having forced upon them what Leonard Sayles calls a "stabilization
relationship," in which the group is given the power of advance approval
or disapproval of some actions in the workflow (Managerial Behavior
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), Ch. 6). In both cases the group viewed
this as an imposition upon them, potentially damaging to both their
research mission and their relations with operating management.
Footnotes, page 3
23. Thompson, op. cit., p. 56.
24. Walter Williams and John W. Evans, "The Politics of-Evaluation: The
Case of lead Start" (July 14, 1969, mimeo), p. 24. Both authors were
connected with the study at 0. E. O., but they maintain that the views
expressed in the paper are not necessarily official.
25. ibid., p. 24.
26. NacAlister Brown, "The Demise of State Department Public Opinion Polls:
A Study of Legislative Oversight," Midwest Journal of Political Science
5:1 (March, 1961), pp. 1 - 17.
27. PEE, p. 234.
28. ibid., p. 233.
29. The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little-Brown, 1964), p. 130.
30. Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Knopf,
1965); Robert Paul Wolff, 'Tolerance," in The Poverty of Liberalism
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).
31. "The New Systems Budgeting," Public Administration Review 29:2
(March, 1969), p. 128.
32. RPA, p. 191.
33. Aaron Wildavsky and Arthur Hammann, "Comprehensive Versus Incremental
Budgeting in the Department of Agriculture," Administrative Science
Quarterly 10:3 (December, 1965), pp. 321 - 346; reprinted in Fremont J.
Lyden and Ernest G. Miller, eds., Planning Programming Budgeting: A Systems
Approach to Management, first edition (Chicago: Markham, 1967), p. 145.
This article and its conclusions should be considered in the context of
the Department's thirty-year experience with program budgets and in the
context of political events surrounding the Department during the period
discussed. The authors consider neither but on the former see "Planning,
Programmiag, and Budgeting in U. S. D. A.," a paper based on a presentation by
Footnotes, page 4.
William A. Carlson during a Civil Service Co mission seminar in PPB,
Alexandria, Va., Dec. 1 - 12, 1969 Washington, D. C.: U. S. D. A., n. d.).
34. The Politics of the Budgetary Process, op. cit., p. 147.
35. Elizabeth B. Drew, "On Giving Oneself a Hotfoot: Government by Commission,"
The Atlantic 221:5 (May, 1968), pp. 45 - 49.
36. Charles L. Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 79, ff.
37. Theodore Lowi, "Liberal Jurisprudence," in The End of Liberalism
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); Victor Rosenblum, Law as a Political
Instrument (New York: Random House, 1955).
38. Consider his The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1965)
as a theoretical essay in organization and management.
39. Charles E. Lindblom, "Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditures,"
in National Bureau of Economic Research, Public Finances : Needs, Sources,
and Utilization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), excerpted
in Alan A, Altshuler, ed., The Politics of the Federal Bureaucracy (hew York:
Dodd-Mead, 1968), p. 170.
40. ibid., p. 165 - 166; Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through."'
Public Administration Review 19 (Spring, 1959), pp. 79 - 88; reprinted in
Robert T. Golembiewski, et. al., eds., Public Administration: Readings in
Institutions, Processes, Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 295.
41. Roger Jones, "The Model as Decision Maker's Dilemma," Public Administration
Review 24:3 (Sept., 1964), pp. 158 - 160; Phillip E. Hammond, ed.,
Sociologists at Work (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1967).
42. Note his approving use of the quotation from Hitch in "The Science of
'Muddling Through,"'". cit., p. 294.
43. "Decision-Waking in Taxation and Expenditures," op. cit., p. 172.
Footnotes, page 5
44. This literature is ably reviewed by David Caputo in "Normative and
Empirical Implications of Budgetary Processes," prepared for delivery
at the 1970 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Los Angeles, September, 1970.
45. "Testimony," in The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System: Progress and
Potentials, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government
of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 90th
Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), hereafter cited as Progress and Potentials, op. cit.
See also the attachments to Davis's testimony in Appendix III,
pp. 252 - 341. The quote is from p. 209.
46. See Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (San Francisco: Chandler,
1968), Chs. 1 - 6.
47. In Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 3 - 30.
48. Stafford Beer, "The Aborting Corporate Plan: A Cybernetic Account of
the Interface Between Planning and Action," in Erich Jantsch, ed.,
Perspectives of Planning (Paris: OECD, 1969), pp. 397 - 422; C. West
Churchman, "Setting the Objectives of Organizations," Internal working
paper #110, 12 pp, and "Suggestive, Predictive, Decisive, and Systemic
Measurement," Internal working paper #95, 12 pp., both Space Sciences
Laboratory, Social Sciences Project, University of California, Berkeley.
49. The Politics of the Budgetary Process op. cit., pp. 156 - 160; Lindblom
is less dogmatic on this point, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,"'
op. cit., p. 300.
50. Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken
Books, 1968); Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism: A View from the
Bottom," Jpurnal of Politics, August, 1970.
51. Charles L. Schultze, op. cit., p. 96.
Footnotes, page 6
52. "Decisiou-Making in Taxation and Expenditures," op. cit., p. 174.
53. E. S. Quade at pp. 13, 36, and 423 in Quade and W. I. Boucher, eds:,
Systems Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in Defense (New York:
American Elsevier, 1968); and Quade, "The Selection and Use of Strategic
Air Bases: A Case History," in Quade, ed., Analysis for Military
Decisions (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 24 - 63.
54. Using the terms as in James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, with the
collaboration of Harold Guetzkow, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 130.
55. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Political Information Systems," in Jantsch, ed.,
op. cit., pp. 307 - 325.
56. Lowi, 2op cit., passim.
57. In spite of Robert Boguslaw, The New Utopians (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1965).
58. Theodore Lowi, "Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote
for Technocracy," Public Administration Review 30:3 (May, 1970), p. 315.
59. Charles E. Lindblom, "Economics and the Administration of National
Planning," Public Administration Review 25:4 (Dec., 1965), pp. 274 - 283.
60. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and
Welfare (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963, originally 1953), p. 100.
61. Lindblom,op. cit., and also his The Intelligence of Democracy, op. cit.
62. Schultze, o . cit., Ch. 6.
63. Robert A. Levine, "Redesigning Social Systems - A Note on Bureaucracy,
Creative Federalism, Business, and the War on Poverty in the United States,"
in Jantsch, ed., op. cit., pp. 449 - 467. See also Charles L. Schultze,
"The Role of Incentives, Penalties, and Rewards in Attaining Effective
Policy," in R. Havemann, ed., Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures:
The PPB System, A Compendium of papers submitted to the Subcommittee on
Economy in Government, Joinr Economic Committee, Congress of the United
States, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
Footnotes, page 7.
Printing Office, 1969), Vol. I, pp. 201 - 225. The Compendium is
hereafter cited as Analysis and Evaluation, oe. cit.
64. Allen Schick, "Systems Politics and Systems Budgeting," Public
Administration Review 29:2 (March, 1969), pp. 137 - 151; David Kettler,
"The Politics of Social Change: The Relevance of Democratic Approaches,"
in William E. Connolly, ed., The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton,
1969), pp. 213 - 249.
65. C. West Churchman, Challenge to Reason (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
66. Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969).
67. Jay W. Forrester, "Planning Under the Dynamic Influences of Complex Social
Systems," in Jantsch, ed., op. cit., pp. 237 - 254.
68. PEE., p. 246.
69. Walton Hamilton, The Politics of Industry New York: Vintage, 1967, originally
1957).
70. As was the case in the State Department as related by F. C. Mosher and
John Harr, Program Budgeting Visits Foreign Affairs (Syracuse: Inter-
University Case Program, Inc., 1969), p. IV-9.
71. William Capron, "Comment," in Chartrand, et. al., eds., op. cit., p. 193.
72. The Politics of the Budgetary Process, op. cit., p. 129.
73. Richard Fenno, "The Impact of PPBS on the Congressional Appropriations
Process," in Chartrand, et. al., eds., op. cit., pp. 175 - 176.
74. Testimony, in Progress and Potentials, op. cit., pp. 207 - 208.
75. E. '., Pluralist Democracy in the United States (Chicago: Rand Mdcally, 1967).
76. Bertram Gross,"The New Systems Budgetiag," op. cit., p. 127.
77. ibid., p. i28.
78. Murray Weidenbaum, The Modern Public Sector (New York: Basic Books, 1969),
pp. 172 - 179.
Footnotes, -page 8
79. Richard Fenno, The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), p. 46 ff.
80. Allen Schick, "Some Problems with Multi-Purpose Budget Systems,"
Washington, D. C.: Bureau of the Budget, Program Evaluation Staff,
December, 1966, p. 22.
81. Fenno, op. cit., p. 22.
82. idem.
83. Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending, op. cit., p. 1.
84. ibid., pp. 85 - 86.
85. ibid., pp. 88 - 89.
86. idem.
87. RPA, p. 191.
88. See the list given by Jack Carlson in "The Status and Next Steps for
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting," in Analysis and Evaluation, op.
cit., Vol. II, p. 628, and also Attachment 12 in the same volume, pp.
763 - 785. A more recent list of analytical studies is submitted by
Carlson in Economic Analysis and the Efficiency of Government, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, 91st Congress, 1st Session
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), Vol. III,
pp. 695 - 697.
89. Mosher and Barr, op. cit., pp. 1-10 to 1-13.
90. ibid., Chapter VII.
91. RPA, pp. 196 - 200; cf. Michael Radnor, "Management Sciences and Policy
Sciences," in Policy Sciences, forthcoming 1970.
92. RPA, p. 196.
93. See Radnor and David Mylan, "Preldminary Annotated Bibliography on the
Management of Operations Research and Management Science," Cooperative
International Program on the Management of Cperations Research and the
Footnotes, page 9
Management Sciences. Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois,
1969.
94. Michael J. White, Management Science in Federal Civilian Agencies,
dissertation in progress, Northwestern University, Department of
Political Science, 1971.
95. The term from Paul Kress, "Self, System, and Significance: Reflections
on Professor Easton's Political Science," Ethics 77:1 (Oct., 1966),
pp. 1 - 13.
96. See Schick's criticism of Wildavsky in "Systems Politics and Systems
Budgeting," op. cit., and Wildavsky's reply in Public Administration
Review 30:2 (March, 1970), pp. 198 - 200.
97. For example, Paul Feldman, "Prescriptions for an Effective
Government: Ethics, Politics, and PPBS," in Analysis and Evaluation,
PL c it., Vol. III, pp. 865 - 885
98. Mosher, "The Limitations and Problems of PPBS in the States," op. cit.,
pp. 163 - 164.
99. Theodore Lowi,'becision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote
for Technocracy," op. cit.
100. Richard Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
(Enlewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963) is an exception.
101. Supra, pg. 15.
102. Nelson Polsby, "Policy Analysis and Congress," in Analysis and
Evaluation, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 943 - 952.
103. Parenti, op. cit., and references therein.
104. Vincent Davis, "The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases,"
Monograph Series in World Affairs 4:3 (1966 - 1967). (Denver: The
University of Denver Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of
Inte:national Studies).
Footnotes, page 10
105. Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy Making Process (Eng'ewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1968).
106. This perspective is evident in James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968).
107. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, op. cit., Chs. 2 - 3. Note that even politically
deviant students are punished by having scholarships withdrawn.
108. See Dorwin Cartwright's introduction to Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in
Social Science (New York: Harper, 1951).
109. Lowi, op. cit.
110. As does Grant McConnell, oe. cit.
111. Analyzed in James T. Bonnen, "The Distribution of Benefits from
Cotton Price Supports," in Samuel B. Chase, ed.,' Problems in Public
Rxa*nditure Analysis (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution,
1968), pp. 223 - 254.
